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Abstract. The objective of this study is to investigate the external 
auditor’s risk assessment of independent directors in Nigeria. The study 
utilized data from 94 non-financial listed companies on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange for the periods 2008-2013. The study used cross-sectional time-
series feasible generalized least square regression, which account for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation to test the influence independent 
non-executive director on auditor pricing decision in Nigeria. Our result 
indicates that the proportion of independent non-executive director has a 
positive relationship with audit fees, suggesting that this class of directors 
is priced high by the Nigerian auditors. These findings have both policy 
and practical implication on corporate governance. For instance, future 
regulatory reforms could consider collaborative board model instead of the 
insistence on more independent director presence in the boardroom.  
1 Introduction 
An important corporate governance mechanism which corporate governance codes have 
given more emphasis since the Enron scandal in the early 2000 has been the independence 
of the board of directors. Board independence through the separation of   the position of the 
CEO and Chairman and the composition of the board with majority of non-executive 
independent directors is highlighted in codes of corporate governance and some empirical 
studies to improve board oversight function. [1, 2, 3; 4 & 5] all provide empirical assertions 
on the monitoring prowess of non-executive independent directors from different 
perspective of organisation outcome consistent with the agency theory. Nevertheless, in the 
recent time, there are countervailing arguments with respect to monitoring prowess of 
independent directors. Notably, Fogel et al. asserted that, “there is no predicate either in 
logic or in experience to suggest that a majority of independent director will guarantee good 
corporate governance or better financial return of shareholders” [6] (pg. 35). Based on their 
findings, [6], found an inconclusive evidence that the dominance of independent directors 
improves firms’ financial performance. Similarly, [7] finding revealed that the presence of 
independent directors does not improve board monitoring in family owned companies 
While, [4] documented that independent directors reduce earnings ability to predict future 
cash flows in the Malaysian context. According to [8], the independent directors do not 
have an adequate understanding of the daily operation of the company. This is because in 
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most cases their presence is only at the instance of the board meeting. As a result, their 
monitoring prowess is weakened.  Based on the foregoing countervailing argument on the 
monitoring prowess of non-executive independent director, this study investigates the 
impact of non-executive independent directors on the assessed inherent risk perceived by 
the Nigerian auditors as revealed in the audit fees charged from the supply perspective like 
prior studies [9; 10]. For over three decades the factors that determined audit fees has 
stimulates researchers interest due to the possibility of auditors’ independence impairment 
[11]. However, despite the abundant studies on audit fees, governance and regulation, the 
overall results have produced conflicting results due to the complex nature of the variables 
[12]. Logically, from the audit supply point of view, sound corporate governance in 
companies indicates that the overall control system is strong, effective and efficient towards 
ensuring sound reporting quality. Accordingly, there will be a negative relationship 
between governance mechanisms and audit fees which implies that strong control 
environment reduces audit fees because the auditor perceived client inherent risk low [9]. 
    Contrary to the findings of [9, 10] our finding suggests that auditor assessment of board 
composition risk affect audit pricing and that the proportion of independent directors tends 
to increase audit fees. Our findings and argument as well contradict the findings of [5] that 
argue from the point of view of audit demand and documented that the presence of increase 
audit fees due to their high demand. Although independent directors supposedly enhance 
board monitoring, in the recent time critics argues that their presence does not necessarily 
enhance board independence, as they might not be truly independent. As documented in the 
findings of [12]” the traditional role and the overbearing influence of family owners in the 
context of Nigeria might limit the oversight function and independence of the board. 
Consistent with this postulation, our findings suggest that the presence of independent 
directors might not be a panacea for weak governance. 
     The contribution of this study is that it provides further evidence from a less studied 
market, Nigeria and thus provides an avenue for future studies most especially from the 
perspective of developing countries whose corporate governance structure are entirely 
different from those of the developed nations. Although, there are studies in this area from 
some emerging economies however, the corporate governance landscape in countries varies 
hence, limiting the generalizability of the frequently researched Anglo-American system in 
the Nigeria setting. In the sense that the indigenization policy embarked upon by the 
Nigerian government as some point in time lead to majority share ownership mostly held 
by founding families who have significant influence on board and on management [13]. 
Accordingly, the assumptions of market efficiency, competitive market and market 
mechanisms which agency theory presuppose are not validly applicable in the Nigerian 
where ownership concentrated [13]. Moreover, the code of corporate governance that was 
revised in 2011 just codified the requirement for the inclusion of non-executive 
independent directors and some companies are yet to comply with this requirement. 
Notwithstanding the poor compliance rate, the independence of the purported independent 
director is susceptible to impairment due to the control retain by founding family. 
Apparently, the distinctiveness of the Nigeria corporate governance environment from the 
corporate governance environment of previous study as highlighted above provides an 
additional opportunity to extend the body of knowledge.  
     The remaining part of the study is as follows: section 2 outline prior literature and 
hypotheses development. We discuss the sample selection procedure and research design in 
section 3 and section 4 contains the presentation of result. The final section concludes the 
study. 
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2 Literature review and hypothesis development  
Based on [14] traditional audit fees model several audit fees studies established the scope of 
audit, the complexity of audit work and the risk associated with an audit as the primary 
determinants of audit fees. Consistent with these three factors, audit fees-governance 
related studies suggest that the strength of client governance environment significantly 
influence the scope and risk associated with an audit engagement [9]. For instance, a strong 
governance environment will reduce audit risk that will subsequently translate into less 
audit scope hence a reduction in audit fees and vice versa. Several characteristics of a 
strong governance environment have been identified in literature and Codes of Corporate 
Governance among which is the extent of board independence (i.e. non-executive 
independent directors). The advocates of independent non-executive directors claimed that 
their presence on board enhance the board of director’s incentive to monitor and discharge 
their oversight function because of the absence of any contractual relationship between 
them and the management. Some of the empirical evidence that support this view are [16] 
that reported that independent directors improve corporate reporting quality and [9] whom 
noted that the presence of non-executive independent director in boardroom enhance 
auditors’ reliance on client accounting system and thus reduce the amount paid as audit 
fees. While there are several empirical studies that established the positive outcome of the 
presence of non-executive independent directors on board other study have found that their 
presence does not necessarily improve board outcome but rather contribute negatively. For 
instance, [17] found a positive relationship between corporate failure propensity and the 
proportion of independent non-executive director on corporate board. Since empirical 
findings regarding the effectiveness of independent non-executive director are inconsistent, 
this present study posits that: 
H1: There is a relationship between the proportion of independent non-executive director in 
boardroom and audit fees. 
3 Methodologies 
3.1 Sample selection and data  
This study used the sample of Nigerian public listed companies with the exclusion of all 
financial companies. In addition to financial companies, this study as well excludes 
companies with missing annual report and missing information. Accordingly, the final 
sample consist 94 companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange between the years of 
2008 and 2013 leading to 426 unbalanced observations.  
3.2 Regression model and specification  
This study employs panel estimation approach to examine the hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance characteristic and audit fees. This approach is 
considered more suitable for a group of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange due to 
the problem of bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity. Due to the presences of 
contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity as characterised in panel data, this 
study employs Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) to correct for this problem. 
However, before then, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no effect in the cross sectional unit over the period of time as the P-value is 
0.000 suggesting that pool OLS is not appropriate. The Hausman test result shows that FE 
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model is preferable to the random effect model. Accordingly, the model as adopted from 
Sminunic [14] is developed as follows: 
 
LOGAF = α + βIND_ + β	LOGTA + β
BIG4
+ βCA + βQUICKRATIO + βGEARING
+ βBUSSEG + βINVT_ + βROA + βLOSS
+ β + β	DELAY + β
BLOCKSHR
+ βINDUSTRY EFFECT + βYEAR EFFECT+ε+μ 
 
Where, log audit fees (LOGAFit) = the amount paid as audit fees by client i in year t; 
independent non-executive director (IND_it) = percentage of directors in the boardroom 
that are independent. Consistent with earlier studies we control for client size, complexity, 
risk and auditor related attribute. Natural log of total asset in thousand (LOGTAit) = client 
size. Auditor related attribute proxy by audit quality (BIG4it) = dummy variable 
representing big four audit firm, coded 1 if the firm is audited by one of the big audit firm 
or 0 otherwise; busy period (BUSYit) = dummy variable representing client that has March 
and December as their financial year end, coded 1 if the client financial year end falls in 
these month or 0 otherwise; audit lag (DELAYit) = the number of days between financial 
year end and the day the audit report was signed. Client risk is proxy by (CAit) = current 
asset to current liability; quick ratio (QUICKRATIOit) = current asset minus inventory 
scaled by current liability and loss (LOSSit) = dummy variable representing client who 
recoded negative earning after interest and tax. Client complexity is proxy by business 
segment (BUSEGit) = number of client business segment; Inventory (INVT_it) = balance 
sheet value of closing inventory scaled by total asset. Measure of client performance 
(ROAit) = net income divided by total asset. Form of ownership (BLOCKSHRit) = 
company outstanding share more than 5% held by individual block shareholders. Finally, 
we control for variation between year and industry. 
4 Empirical analyses 
Table 1 present the result of the cross-sectional time-series FGLS used to examine auditors’ 
risk assessment of independent directors in Nigeria and the result indicates that that audit 
fees is positively related to the proportion of independent director (IND_) on board 
(P<0.01) and this is consistent the current study postulation. With respect to the control, 
variables with the exception of few variables are consistent with theory [11]. Client size 
measured by log total asset (LOGTA) has a positive relationship with audit fees. Similarly, 
client complexity measured by number of business segment (BUSSEG) and inventory 
(INVT_) as well has a positive relationship with audit fees, suggesting that complex client 
pay more consistent with agency theory. Client risk proxy by current asset ratio (CA) and 
GEARING reveals a negative coefficient while quick ratio (QUICKRATIO) exhibit 
positive relationship with audit fees. Profitability measured by LOSS has positive 
relationship with audit fees. BLOCKSHR exhibit a negative relationship with audit. 
Auditor related attributes BIG4 and BUSY as expected have a positive relationship with 
audit fees. 
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 Table 1. Regression Result for audit fees 
Variable Model 
CON 1.16 
 (13.20 ***) 
IND_ 0.20 
 (5.12***) 
LOGTA 0.37 
 (33.37***) 
BIG4 0.32 
 (18.29***) 
CA -0.06 
 ( -2.66***) 
QUICKRATIO  0.06 
 (2.41***) 
BUSSEG  0.02 
 (3.63***) 
INVT_ 0.05 
 -0.86 
ROA 0.00 
 -0.16 
LOSS 0.06 
 (3.12***) 
GEARING  -0.01 
 (-2.04***) 
BUSY  0.06 
 (3.94***) 
DELAY 0.00 
 (-1.77**) 
BLOCKSHR -0.01 
 (-12.69***) 
YEAR EFFECT YES 
INDUSTRY EFFECT YES 
Obs 426.00 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE  0.89 
F-STATISTIC  0.00 
Notes: *** Signiﬁcant at 1 per cent level; **, signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level; *, significant at 10 per cent (two-
tailed). The dependent variable is log of audit fees (LOGAF). A continuous variable that represent the amount 
collected as auditor’s remuneration in Naira.  
 Discussion of findings and conclusion  
In this study, we investigated the Nigerian auditor risk assessment of non-executive 
independent directors of public listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Towards 
the set objective, we employ cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression which controls 
the issues of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation on a sample of 94 public listed Nigerian 
companies. The findings indicate that an increase in the proportion of independent director 
increase the amount paid as audit fees. Overall, the result reveals some weakness in 
independent directors’ performance of their advisory and monitoring role has consequence 
for auditor risk assessment hence the audit fees. The findings of this study have implication 
for audit fees literature. Against prior studies that examined the relationship between 
independent board and auditor pricing decision from the supply perspective, the present 
study finding indicates that the presence of non-executive independent director does not 
necessary guarantee good corporate governance. Therefore, future research most especially 
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those undertaken in the less developed market with prevalence of family ownership could 
consider the collaborative board model. Because, recent literatures [15] have begun to fault 
the one-dimensional view of board role as dominant in literature and recommends that 
studies should consider other board responsibility in relation to auditing. In addition, future 
study could embark on a more in-depth study by segregating the so called independent 
director by the extent of their true independence to determine how it affect the risk 
perception of external auditors. This is imperative due to recent literatures that questions 
the genuineness of the so called independent directors on corporate board.  
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